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 
Abstract — Distribution networks are evolving towards the 
vision of smart grids, with increasing penetration of Distributed 
Generation (DG), introduction of Active Network Management 
(ANM) and potentially islanded modes of operation. These 
changes affect both fault levels and fault current paths and have 
been demonstrated to compromise the correct operation of the 
overcurrent protection system. 
This paper presents an adaptive overcurrent protection system 
which automatically amends the protection settings of all 
overcurrent relays in response to the impact of DG, ANM and 
islanding operation. The scheme has been developed using 
commercially available protection devices, employs IEC61850 
based communications and has been demonstrated and tested 
using a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) laboratory facility. 
A systematic comparison of the performance of the proposed 
adaptive scheme alongside that of a conventional overcurrent 
scheme is presented. This comparison quantifies the decrease in 
false operations and the reduction of mean operating time that 
the adaptive system offers. 
 
Index Terms—Adaptive protection, network automation, 
distributed generation, islanded operation, time overcurrent 
protection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE on-going increase in the penetration of DG and the 
adoption of ANM solutions in distribution networks 
throughout the world creates a network protection challenge 
due to the effects on fault levels and fault current paths. 
DG introduces an additional source of fault current, which 
may increase the total fault level within the network, while 
possibly altering the magnitude and direction of the fault 
currents seen by specific protection relays. The contribution of 
one single generating unit is normally not large, but the 
aggregate effect of many generating units can have a 
significant impact on fault currents and affect the operation of 
the overcurrent protection system [1]. 
ANM solutions, which have been introduced to manage 
DG, energy storage, loads, circuit breakers and switches to 
allow voltage control, power flow management, demand side 
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management, automatic restoration and minimization of power 
system losses, also affect the fault levels and the fault current 
paths [2].  
Furthermore, as the penetration of DG increases, the 
islanded operation of certain sections of the distribution 
network may become beneficial and increase the reliability of 
power supply to the customers [3]. However, changing 
between islanded and grid connected modes of operation 
creates two scenarios with very different fault levels [4]. 
The combination of DG, ANM and the potential for 
islanded operation results in network conditions where fault 
levels and fault current paths change disturbing the operation 
of the overcurrent relays (OCRs). The authors of [1, 5-8] 
showed that DG affects the sensitivity and the operating time 
of the OCRs while the authors of [9] proved that changes in 
network topology compromise the correct coordination 
between OCRs. The impact of islanding was analyzed in [4, 
10], where the authors assessed the amount of fault level 
reduction during islanded operation and proved that it causes 
slow operating times and possible blinding of OCRs. 
Solutions to the impact of DG have been presented in [11] 
where the authors suggest the adoption of  distance protection, 
in [12-14] where the authors propose the use of fault current 
limiters (FCLs) and in [14-16] where the authors suggest to 
use adaptive protection. The authors of [14, 15] have proposed 
to use to sets of protection settings, one for DG connected and 
one for DG not connected to the network, while the authors of 
[16] have proposed a scheme where the settings of overcurrent 
protection relays are amended in real time based on the fault 
level and the DG connection status. A solution that caters for 
islanded operation has been proposed in [10, 17], where the 
authors demonstrate how a simple adaptive overcurrent 
protection scheme with two setting groups, one for grid 
connected and one for islanded mode of operation may solve 
the problem. It appears that, as yet, no solution has been 
proposed to address the impact of ANM systems on network 
protection. 
All of the proposed adaptive overcurrent protection systems 
in the literature seem concentrate on the solution to a specific 
protection performance problem and disregard other aspects of 
future networks that may impact on performance. Therefore, 
these schemes are somewhat limited, as in future it is likely 
that DG, ANM and islanded operation will all be factors that 
will impact on protection. 
Accordingly, this paper presents an adaptive overcurrent 
protection scheme that addresses all of these issues 
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simultaneously. The main difficulty in developing a solution 
to the aggregated problems caused by DG, ANM and 
islanding is that the number of possible network conditions is 
very large and it becomes unfeasible to pre-calculate 
protection settings and establish a manageable number of 
setting groups which would cover all potential situations. 
Therefore, the solution proposed in this paper does not use 
pre-calculated setting groups but rather establishes the 
optimum protection settings and applies them to the relays 
directly whenever there is a significant change in the network, 
either in terms of DG connectivity, grid connected/islanded 
status or changes implemented by an ANM system.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
proposed adaptive overcurrent protection system, its 
architecture and its algorithm, section III presents the test case 
distribution network, and section IV illustrates the hardware-
in-the-loop (HIL) simulation environment used to test the 
proposed solution. Finally, section V presents the simulation 
results and, through comparison, quantifies the improvements, 
in terms of dependability, security and mean operation time, 
offered by the adaptive system over a traditional system.  
II. ADAPTIVE OVERCURRENT PROTECTION SYSTEM  
The adaptive overcurrent protection system has been 
developed using a three layer architecture illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The separation of functional layers has been established 
according to the type of data used and the required response 
time for each functional group [18].  
 
Fig. 1. Adaptive overcurrent protection system architecture 
The primary system is at the foot of the diagram, and 
includes lines, transformers, DG, Circuit Breakers (CBs), 
Circuit Switches (CSs), Current Transformers (CTs), Voltage 
Transformers (VTs), etc. Directly above this is the execution 
layer, which includes the IEDs installed in the network (e.g. 
OCRs). The interfaces between the first two layers consist of 
hardwired links for the provision of measurement data and 
tripping commands or IEC 61850 process bus communication. 
The execution layer is connected to the coordination layer, 
which is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the 
IEDs. Finally, at the top there is an energy management layer, 
which is responsible for managing the overall network and 
communicates to the coordination layer to achieve 
coordination between adaptive overcurrent protection and 
ANM. The interface between execution, coordination and 
management layers are based on communication protocols 
such as: DNP3, Modbus, IEC60870-5-103 and IEC61850. 
The execution layer is composed of OCRs, receiving 
measurement data from CTs (and in some cases VTs) and 
tripping CB(s) when faults are detected that should be cleared 
by the specific OCR(s).  
The execution layer is an autonomous layer, i.e. the tripping 
decisions are taken locally using local data without any 
communication with other layers. This means that in case of 
communication failure between the execution layer and the 
coordination layer, the overcurrent protection is not affected. 
If its settings were to be changed remotely, this would not be 
possible upon failure of the coordination layer or failure of the 
communication link between these layers, however this would 
not compromise the overcurrent protection system but would 
mean that the protection settings are not optimized until the 
communication is restored. 
The implementation of the adaptive protection system is 
facilitated by the introduction of enhanced functionality to the 
coordination layer, which includes additional functions that 
are not present in a traditional protection system. Fig. 2 
presents the algorithm of the developed adaptive overcurrent 
protection system.  
 
Fig. 2. Adaptive overcurrent protection algorithm 
The algorithm is initiated either by the monitoring block in 
the coordination layer which reacts to changes in the network, 
or by the energy management system which communicates 
reconfiguration of the network topology, connection-
disconnection of DG and islanded/grid connected changes.  
The adaptive protection system has been implemented using 
a centralized approach, where setting calculations and 
modification commands are performed by one processing unit, 
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rather than the agent based approach, which typically involves 
distribution of both processing burden and decision making. 
The reasons why the centralized approach has been adopted 
are: simpler implementation in real distribution networks 
where the present SCADA is centralized, easier 
commissioning and validation of the centralized solution 
because compare to the agent based solution. 
The following sections explain the individual components 
of the adaptive overcurrent protection algorithm. 
A. Fault current calculation 
Considering the actual network configuration and the status 
of the DG connection, a series of faults are simulated (usually 
at the source and remote end of each network section) to 
calculate the fault current measured by the OCRs for each 
fault scenario. A program, written in Python 2.7 [19], accesses 
the IPSA Power [20] fault calculation tool through its 
application program interface (API), simulates the faults 
(through instructing IPSA to execute the appropriate 
simulations) and saves the fault currents that would be 
measured by each protection device for every simulated fault. 
These are saved to a fault current matrix F. 
۴ = ቎ܫ௙ଵଵ ڮ ܫ௙ଵ௠ڭ ڰ ڭܫ௙௡ଵ ڮ ܫ௙௡௠቏  (1) 
Where n is the number of protection devices and m is the 
number of simulated faults. 
B. Calculation of new protection settings  
New protection settings are calculated considering the 
present configuration of the network. All OCRs’ settings are 
calculated in a “downstream to upstream” fashion, i.e. starting 
from the HV/LV transformers’ fixed fuse current/time 
characteristics.  
This approach is different from the common approach used 
by distribution network operators (DNOs) to calculate the 
protection settings because DNOs normally calculate the 
protection settings starting from upstream, i.e. grading from 
the protections at higher voltages and moving downstream; 
and favors one set of protection settings which would be 
applicable to all different network configurations. The reason 
why downstream to upstream calculation method has been 
adopted instead of the common DNO approach is that it 
minimizes the protection operating time of the OC protection 
system for each specific network condition or configuration. 
C. Protection system response calculation 
The protection system response to fault current matrix F is 
calculated using both the prevailing protection settings and the 
new proposed protection settings as calculated in section II.B. 
The results are saved in the operating time matrices ܂଴ and ܂ଵ 
for the present settings and the new settings respectively.  
܂଴ = ቎ݐଵଵ଴ ڮ ݐଵ௠଴ڭ ڰ ڭݐ௡ଵ଴ ڮ ݐ௡௠଴ ቏;          ܂ଵ = ቎ݐଵଵଵ ڮ ݐଵ௠ଵڭ ڰ ڭݐ௡ଵଵ ڮ ݐ௡௠ଵ ቏ (2) 
Where n is the number of protection devices being 
considered; and m is the number of simulated faults. 
D. Comparison of relative performance and setting 
application decision 
The protection system responses (both with the prevailing 
settings and the new settings) are analyzed to establish if 
improvement can be achieved through setting modification. If 
the new protection settings improve the performance, the 
decision is made to apply the new settings, otherwise no 
further action is taken.  
To compare the protection system responses ܂଴ and ܂ଵ, a 
dedicated algorithm has been designed (implemented in 
Python 2.7) which analyses both matrices in order to: 
1. Verify that the operation time of each OCR is within 
the limits specified in the protection policy; 
2. Verify the grading margin between protection devices; 
3. Calculate the mean operation time. 
For example, considering a simple circuit in Fig. 3, step 1 
verifies that for faults 4 and 5 the operation time of OCR C is 
shorter than the limits specified in the protection requirements 
(e.g. an operation time limit of 1s is typically used in utility 
protection policies). Step 2 verifies that the difference of the 
operation time between OCR C and the back-up protection 
OCR B is greater than the minimum grading margin specified 
in the protection requirements (an example grading margin is 
0.3s in a typical utility protection policy). 
Steps 1 and 2 are repeated for a series of simulated faults at 
different locations (the source and remote end of each feeder 
section) as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Fault locations for the protection system response comparison 
The first two steps have a higher priority with respect to the 
third step, therefore if ܂ଵ does not pass the two verification 
steps but ܂଴ does, the proposed new settings are discarded, 
while if ܂଴ does not pass the two verification steps and ܂ଵ 
does, the proposed new settings are applied, without the third 
verification step.  
If both ܂଴ and ܂ଵ pass the first and the second verification, 
the third step is the comparison of the mean operation times 
obtained from ܂଴ and ܂ଵ according to equations (3) and (4). 
t௠௘௔௡଴ = 1݊݉෍ቌ෍ݐ௜௝଴௠௝ୀଵ ቍ௡௜ୀଵ   (3) 
t௠௘௔௡ଵ =  1݊݉෍ቌ෍ݐ௜௝ଵ௠௝ୀଵ ቍ௡௜ୀଵ  (4) 
Finally, the two mean operation times are compared using 
equation (5), and if the condition is satisfied, the new 
protection settings are applied.  
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t௠௘௔௡଴ െ t௠௘௔௡ଵ > 'ݐ௠ (5) 
where 'ݐ௠ the minimum difference of the mean times below 
which the new settings are not applied because the benefit in 
changing the protection settings would be negligible compared 
to the risk of fault occurring during the change process.   
E. Applying new protection settings and verification 
The final step of the algorithm is to send the new protection 
settings to the OCRs. This is achieved using IEC61850 
communication in two stages. The first stage involves sending 
the settings, while the second phase involves reading the 
settings in order to verify that they have been correctly 
applied.  
An IEC61850 compliant protection relay can facilitate two 
approaches that will enable the application of variable 
protection settings: 
The first approach is based on the employment of protection 
setting groups. Typically, four or more protection setting 
groups can be defined and the adaptive protection system can 
select the group that represents the closest match to the 
specific calculated protection settings. 
The second approach does not employ predefined protection 
setting groups. Each specific protection setting (e.g. pick up 
current, time multiplier, etc.) is accessible for modification 
and the adaptive protection system can write the calculated 
protection settings on an individual basis. 
The first approach has the advantage to avoid the risk of 
applying wrong protection settings which might cause false 
tripping or no operation of the protection system during faults 
while the advantage of the second approach is that it allows 
more flexibility. 
III. DISTRIBUTION TEST CASE NETWORK MODEL 
The test case network used in this paper is an 11kV 
overhead rural distribution network, the “OHA Network”, as 
specified in the United Kingdom Generic Distribution 
Network (UKGDS)[21]. Fig. 4 depicts the topology of the 
network which consists of three main feeders and several 
relatively long spurs. 
Both 33/11 kV transformers are rated at 12MVA, with 8.5% 
per-unit reactance, delta-star winding configuration and solid 
earth connections on the 11kV side. The lengths of feeders A, 
B and C are 8.5km, 3.5km and 2.2km respectively. Feeder A 
is rated at 400A (7.62MVA), while feeders B and C both have 
a rating of 250A (4.76MVA). 
The protection system has been designed to accurately 
represent present-day networks and adheres to a protection 
policy that has been supplied by a UK distribution network 
operator (DNO). As shown in Fig. 4, each feeder is protected 
by a multi-shot circuit breaker/recloser at the source end, and 
by a Pole Mounted Auto-Recloser (PMAR) situated at 
approximately 50% along the feeder. Spurs are connected to 
the main feeder through spur sectionalizers rather than via 
fuses, due to the prevailing trend within DNOs to substitute 
fuses with spur sectionalizers in modern and future 
distribution networks.  
IV. LABORATORY IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION 
The developed adaptive protection solution has been 
implemented and demonstrated in a HIL laboratory 
environment, shown in Fig. 5, in order to verify its 
effectiveness and compare its performance with a traditional 
overcurrent protection system. 
The real time digital simulator (RTDS) is used to simulate 
the primary system behavior in real time during normal and 
faulty conditions. The output currents of the simulated CTs are 
amplified using slave amplifiers to inject the OCRs, which 
operate as if they were connected to a real distribution 
network and, in the presence of faults, send tripping signals 
using IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. The tripping signals are 
received by the RTDS as an input to the simulation, closing 
the simulation loop. 
 
Fig. 4. Distribution network test case diagram 
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Fig. 5. HIL laboratory testing environment 
A DNP3 master installed on the substation computer is used 
to communicate with the RTDS to gather periodically status 
information of CBs, PMARs, network switches, etc. This data 
is then used by the adaptive overcurrent protection software 
installed in the substation computer to monitor the network 
and detect changes which initiate the adaptive algorithm 
shown in Fig. 2.  
When the adaptive protection software is required to change 
the protection settings of one or more OCRs, this is achieved 
using an IEC61850-8 master installed in the substation 
computer to communicate with the OCRs. 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed 
adaptive overcurrent protection system, a number of scenarios 
have been simulated (refer to Table I). 
The adaptability of the protection system is stimulated by 
applying various changes to the network configuration. After 
each change a set of pre-defined faults are simulated to verify 
the protection system performance. 
A. Network scenarios 
Scenarios summarized in Table I have been generated to 
include the following stimuli to the adaptive overcurrent 
protection system: 
x Change of fault level due to changes of fault level at 
33kV and the number of in-service transformers at the 
33/11kV distribution substation. Normally both 
transformers are in operation, but in some cases one 
may be disconnected. 
x Islanded operation of the 11kV network, which may be 
permissible if appropriate DG units are in service. 
x Change of 11kV distribution network topology, which 
can be varied by shifting the normally open points 
(NOP) as necessary. 
x Connection/disconnection of the DG units. 
B. Fault simulations 
In order to verify the response of the adaptive overcurrent 
protection system, a series of pre-defined faults have been 
simulated for each network scenario, in twelve different fault 
locations, as shown in Fig. 6. 
The faults simulated at each location include: 
• Eleven phase to phase faults with a fault resistance 
EHWZHHQDQGHWF 
• Eleven phase to earth faults with a fault resistance 
EHWZHHQDQGHWF 
All faults have been simulated twice, to test both the 
traditional overcurrent protection system as well as the 
adaptive overcurrent protection system. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The protection system response of the developed adaptive 
scheme and of the conventional overcurrent protection system 
with fixed protection settings has been recorded for phase to 
phase and phase to earth faults described in section IV.B. 
Fig. 7 shows the measured operating times of the 
conventional and adaptive overcurrent protection systems for 
all of the 2112 simulated phase faults. The responses are 
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Fig. 6 Fault locations for the HIL simulation 
TABLE I 
NETWORK SCENARIOS 
N. 
33kV fault 
level 
(MVA) 
Substation 
transformers 
in service 
Normally  
Open  
Points 
DG  
units 
in service 
1 300 2 S3, S6 No 
2 300 2 S1, S6 No 
3 300 2 S4, S6 No 
4 300 2 S5, S7 No 
5 300 2 S3, S6 Yes 
6 300 2 S1, S6 Yes 
7 300 2 S4, S6 Yes 
8 300 2 S5, S7 Yes 
9 100 1 S3, S6 Yes 
10 100 1 S1, S6 Yes 
11 100 1 S4, S6 Yes 
12 100 1 S5, S7 Yes 
13 NC NC S3, S6 Yes 
14 NC NC S1, S6 Yes 
15
 
NC NC S4, S6 Yes 
16 NC NC S5, S7 Yes 
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ordered according to the tripping time starting from the 
longest. For the first 456 longest faults, the operation of the 
adaptive overcurrent protection is faster than the conventional 
IDMT overcurrent protection system, reducing the number of 
operating times longer than 1s from 7.15% to 1.81% of the 
total number of simulated faults. 
For all of the other faults, there is no appreciable difference 
in tripping time, because the delay times of the DTL 
characteristics are identical. The only exception is for the 
fault scenarios between 1214 and 1388, where the adaptive 
overcurrent protection system has a slower tripping time. 
This is due to the correction of the DTL overcurrent 
protection settings to guarantee correct coordination between 
the OCRs when the network topology changes.  
Fig. 8 shows the operating time of conventional and 
adaptive overcurrent protection system measured for the 2112 
simulated earth faults also ordered according to the tripping 
time and starting from the longest response. Note that, as with 
the phase fault results, the operation of the adaptive 
protection system is slower for some faults, which is 
necessary to ensure correct coordination between OCRs as 
the network topology changes. The increase in operating time 
is not significant and it is not considered to be a problem 
since the maximum operating time is of 0.572s. From the 
results, it is clear that the adaptive protection can be 
marginally slower in some cases for both phase and earth 
faults. Nevertheless, overall improvement in performance is 
achieved as coordination problems are avoided by the 
modification of settings and increased time response to some 
of the simulated faults. 
The analysis of the results revealed that the adaptive 
overcurrent protection system has improved selectivity and 
sensitivity with respect to conventional overcurrent 
protection, for example, when the network topology is 
changed. It also provides improved coordination with the DG 
interface protection compared to conventional overcurrent 
protection. Selected cases are presented below to demonstrate 
some of these advantages.  
 
Fig. 7 Measured operating time of conventional and adaptive protection during phase to phase faults 
 
Fig. 8 Measured operating time of conventional and adaptive protection during phase to earth faults 
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TABLE II 
PROTECTION SETTINGS NETWORK SCENARIO 1 
 
IDMT Phase OC DTL Phase OC Earth DTL OC 
 
CH Iset TMS Iset DTL Iset DTL 
AR-A SI 400 0.16 1000 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-A SI 250 0.1 625 0.16 30 0.16 
AR-B SI 350 0.2 875 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-B SI 220 0.1 550 0.16 30 0.16 
AR-C SI 300 0.28 750 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-C SI 180 0.1 450 0.16 30 0.16 
TABLE III 
PROTECTION SETTINGS NETWORK SCENARIO 3 
 
IDMT Phase OC DTL Phase OC Earth DTL OC 
 
CH Iset TMS Iset DTL Iset DTL 
AR-A SI 400 0.17 1000 0.48 30 0.48 
PMAR-A SI 250 0.12 625 0.32 30 0.32 
AR-B SI 250 0.1 625 0.16 30 0.16 
PMAR-B SI 160 0.1 400 0.16 30 0.16 
AR-C SI 300 0.28 750 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-C SI 180 0.1 450 0.16 30 0.16 
TABLE IV 
PROTECTION SETTINGS NETWORK SCENARIO 13 
 
IDMT Phase OC DTL Phase OC Earth DTL OC 
 
CH Iset TMS Iset DTL Iset DTL 
AR-A SI 240 0.12 600 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-A SI 150 0.1 375 0.16 30 0.16 
AR-B SI 210 0.18 525 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-B SI 130 0.1 325 0.16 30 0.16 
AR-C SI 180 0.19 450 0.32 30 0.32 
PMAR-C SI 100 0.1 250 0.16 30 0.16 
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A. Impact of network automation 
Considering scenarios 1 and 3 in Table I, when the network 
switches from one scenario to another, the adaptive 
overcurrent protection system calculates the protection 
settings for the new scenario and applies them to the OCRs. 
Table II and Table III report the automatically calculated 
protection settings for the two scenarios.  
The difference between scenario 1 and scenario 3 is the 
change of network configuration, i.e. the fact that the NOP is 
shifted from S3 to S4. The change of network topology affects 
both fault current magnitude and path in case of faults in 
feeder A and B. The new protection settings are therefore 
different for OCRs AR-A, PMAR-A, AR-B and PMAR-B as 
can be observed by comparing Tables II and III. The numbers 
in bold indicate the modified protection settings. 
Without the developed adaptive protection system, i.e. using 
fixed protection settings, the operation speed and correct  
selectivity of the overcurrent protection system are affected. 
For example, DSKDVHWRSKDVHIDXOWEHWZHHQ30$5-B and 
S4 (fault 6 in Fig. 6) causes the operation of both PMAR-A 
and PMAR-B, as shown in Fig. 9, which causes the 
unnecessary disconnection of all loads connected between 
PMAR-A and PMAR-B. With the adaptive system, the 
problem of miss-coordination between PMAR-A and PMAR-
B is solved in this particular example, as shown in Fig. 10. 
When considering the complete population of simulated faults, 
it is clear that the instances of false tripping have been reduced 
from 4.72% to 1.61% (improved security). 
B. Impact of DG 
Consider scenario 5 in Table I, DG1, DG2, DG3 and DG4 
are connected to the network. The presence of DG increases 
the fault level, changes the magnitudes and paths of fault 
currents and therefore may cause false tripping and affect the 
coordination between OCRs.  
An example of false tripping is when, in scenario 5, there is 
a fault on feeder B (fault 4) and the AR-A trips simultaneously 
with AR-B. This is due to the fault current contribution of 
DG1 and DG2 to fault 5 and this situation is typical when 
DNOs adopt DTL instead of IDMT overcurrent protection.  
To overcome this issue, the protection settings calculated by 
the overcurrent protection software, and presented in Tables 
II, III and IV, are based on IDMT overcurrent protection plus 
DTL overcurrent protection for relatively higher fault currents. 
The DTL pickup current for the protection on each feeder is 
higher than the total fault current contributions from DGs on 
the protected feeders to faults located in adjacent feeders.  
Another example of false tripping is due to incorrect 
overload tripping of OCRs. This happens with traditional 
overcurrent protection when the network topology is changed 
and DG creates a load flow that is higher than the tripping 
current of an OCR. For example, if the network switches to 
scenario 8, all DG units are connected to feeder 1 and with 
fixed protection settings may cause false tripping of PMAR-A. 
While by automatically adapting the protection settings 
(within the thermal limits of the network), i.e. increasing the 
pickup current of PMAR-A to be higher than sum of the 
maximum generation from DG2, DG3 and DG4, the problem 
of false tripping may be overcome. 
C. Impact of islanded operation 
Considering the case when the network changes from grid 
connected to islanded operation, the fault level changes 
significantly. For example, from scenario 1 to 10 in Table I, 
the fault level at the 11kV bus bar decreases from 6.8kA to 
1.7kA, affecting both speed and sensitivity of the protection, 
potentially leading to slow or even non operation during a 
fault. This may lead to disconnection of the DG supplying the 
network due to DG interface protection operation.  
Dependability of the protection system can be improved in 
this case by the appropriate adaptation of settings. For 
example, for a fault downstream of PMAR-B, fault 8, in 
scenario 10, the standard overcurrent protection system is too 
slow  as  shown  in  Fig. 11,  and therefore  the  DG  interface 
 
Fig. 9 Fault 6 in scenario 3 without adaptive over-current protection  
 
Fig. 10 Fault 6 in scenario 3 with adaptive over-current protection 
0                     0.133                  0.267                  0.400                    0.533                  0.667    0.8     [s] 
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
A
R
-A
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
P
M
A
R
-A
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
P
M
A
R
-B
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
AR-A Trip
AR-A Status
PMAR-A Trip
PMAR-A Status
PMAR-B Trip
PMAR-B Status
0                     0.133                  0.267                  0.400                    0.533                  0.667    0.8     [s] 
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
A
R
-A
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
P
M
A
R
-A
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
P
M
A
R
-B
 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
[k
A
]
AR-A Trip
AR-A Status
PMAR-A Trip
PMAR-A Status
PMAR-B Trip
PMAR-B Status
> PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER< 
 
8 
 
Fig. 11 Fault 8 in scenario 13 without adaptive over-current protection  
 
Fig. 12. Fault 8 in scenario 13 with adaptive over-current protection 
 
protection trips before the overcurrent protection system 
isolates the faulted zone. 
In the simulation the interface of the DG has been 
configured with protection using settings defined in 
G59/2[22].   Fig. 11 shows that the under voltage protection 
trips the DG units after 0.5s. 
Simulating the same fault, but with the developed adaptive 
overcurrent protection system (which changes the protection 
settings to the values reported in Table IV as soon as the 
network changes configuration), the overcurrent protection 
operation is faster as shown in Fig. 11.  With the overcurrent 
protection operating faster, the voltage sags has a shorter 
duration (as shown in Fig. 12) and DG1, DG2 and DG3 are 
not disconnected, but continue to supply the loads. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the widespread introduction of DG and ANM 
schemes and the potential for islanded operation of networks 
in the future will present significant challenges to existing 
network protection. This paper has illustrated how an adaptive 
protection scheme can act to address many of these problems 
and has demonstrated its implementation using a realistic 
model of an actual distribution network with commercially 
available hardware and communication schemes.  
The novelty of the adaptive overcurrent protection system 
proposed in this paper is in its algorithm, which differs from 
other adaptive protection solutions presented in the literature 
in terms of its possession of higher flexibility and 
comprehensive coverage of all events that may influence the 
behavior of the protection system. The algorithm has been 
explained in detail, focusing on the protection settings 
calculation technique and the protection system response 
evaluation.  
The proposed adaptive protection solution is more flexible 
with respect to other solutions presented in the literature, 
which are largely based on pre-calculated protection settings 
and settings groups. The limitations of using setting groups 
with pre-calculated settings is overcome by calculating the 
optimal protection settings in real time and applying them, 
after verification of their effectiveness using model-based 
performance evaluation, to the OCRs when the network status 
changes. 
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